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Introduction 
With the substitution of market rules for central planning in eastern Germany the shifts 
in the production structure are an important question.  From the EC perspective there is concern 
that commodity production in eastern Germany will develop in a manner which contributes to 
the already existing surpluses of major commodities.  For non-EC countries there are concerns 
over the possible trade impacts.  Grain and protein feed exporting countries had a strong market 
in East Germany during the 1970's.  While grain imports fell in the 1980's, imports of protein 
feed by East Germany remained considerable.  With the changed economic conditions questions 
arose over the short and long-run adjustments. Some observers believed that economic reform 
would create new market opportunities for exporting countries.  Others saw increased output of 
farm commodities by eastern Germany as more competition on already weak world markets. 
A third group argued that a China type pattern would appear where short-run output gains would 
be followed by increased food demand due to per capita income gains.  Imports would initially 
fall, but later would rise. 
There  are  two  major  objectives  for  this  paper.  One  is  to  understand  the  initial 
adjustments in the production structure by commodity and why these adjustments occurred.  The 
second aspect of the paper is  to guess the future of agricultural production in  the longer-run 
based on the historical experience of the region and on the initial adjustments.  Both objectives 
are intended to facilitate understanding the agricultural trade implications of introducing market 
forces  in eastern  Germany.  The focus  of the paper is  on  the adjustment in  the production 
structure because there is little evidence of potential demand growth for agricultural goods in 
aggregate.  At  most  there will be some slight shifts among  food  categories  toward  western 
patterns,  particularly  a  shift  to  high  quality  and  specialty  products  (Grings,  pp.  192-193; 
Jahresgutachten  1991192,  p.  78).  Additionally,  as  shown  later,  evidence from  the livestock 
sector suggests a weakened demand for feedstuffs. 
The paper is organized into three major sections.  The first section considers agricultural 
production  prior to  German  reunification  in  1990.  It looks  at the  agricultural  production 
structure in the region prior to the division of Germany in 1945 as well as the patterns which 
arose under the communist government.  The second section starts with the 1989 situation and 
then discusses  the initial adjustments seen as  market forces  are introduced -- 1990 and  1991. 
The third section builds upon this base to speculate on how the production structure will unfold 
in the future. 
Agriculture in Eastern Germany before Reunification 
This  section  covers  the  historical  experience  of  agricultural  production  before 
reunification, roughly the years 1880-1989.  Nothing guarantees that the old production structure 
will reemerge as conditions have greatly changed.  Yet knowledge of the historical record is an 
4 important input into  understanding  the  initial adjustment  seen  and  into  speculation  over the 
future. 
Natural Conditions 
The natural conditions of a region play a role in determining the production structure 
although  technical  change  has  reduced  the  constraints  imposed  by  natural  conditions  on 
production decisions.  While extreme cases can be cited, such as Saudi Arabia producing and 
exporting wheat, natural conditions continue to affect production choices.  As in any region of 
its size, eastern Germany shows a considerable diversity in natural conditions. 
Topographically  three  broad patterns can be distinguished.  A  substantial part of the 
country is relatively flat and well designed for crops and livestock.  This characterizes the land 
from the Baltic coast through Berlin and on to around Dresden.  Most of Thuringia and large 
parts of Saxony are rolling.  While these are suited to both crops and livestock, some localities -
-the more rugged ones-- would favor grazing livestock -- cattle.  Within eastern Germany there 
are mountain or foothill  regions  clearly  favoring  cattle.  These would include the Harz,  the 
Eichsfeld, and the Thuringian forest areas. 
Soil conditions vary greatly.  Overall the land's basic quality is good (Kloos, p. 6).  Of 
the arable area, 20 percent is sand with little basic productivity, while 40 percent is sandy with 
medium to good productivity (Kurjo, p.  12).  The remainder consists of forest soils which are 
generally well-drained and of  comparatively high quality.  Generalizations by state are dangerous 
since  soil  types  do  not  respect  jurisdictional  boundaries.  The  sandy  soils  are  found  in 
Brandenburg and substantial parts of Mecklenburg-Pomerania whereas the forest soils tend to 
occur in Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia.  The coastal strip in Mecklenburg-Pomerania 
has quite good soils, and Saxony-Anhalt is considered to have among the best soils in Western 
Europe, particularly around Magdeburg and Halle. (A detailed discussion of soil characteristics 
can be found in Mellor). 
Since eastern Germany lies in the center of the continent the climate is considered less 
favorable to agriculture than is the case in western Germany.  Summers are warmer and winters 
colder with a 10-15 day shorter growing season.  Average rainfall is three-quarters of the level 
for western Germany with several relatively dry areas in the rain shields of the Harz, Eichsfeld, 
and the Thuringian forest regions (Gebauer, pp. 90-91).  Irrigated crops, including grains,  in 
these regions were common in the communist period. 
Population  pressure  on  the land  also  varies  regionally.  By  European  standards  the 
northern  states of Mecklenburg-Pomerania and Brandenburg are relatively thinly settled with 
population concentrations increasing to the south.  The southern states have a higher, but still 
comparatively light, population density. Overall the population to land ratio in eastern Germany 
is much lower than that for western Germany (Kloos, p. 6). 
5 Production Patterns up to the Second World War 
Reviewing production patterns by commodity from the late 19th century until the Second 
World War has two advantages for understanding the future of the region.  First, up to 1933 the 
sector operated in a market economy without central controls being imposed.  Secondly, until 
the end of the Second World War the agricultural sectors of the two parts of Germany were 
linked.  These are the conditions which prevail after German reunification.  Yet it would be a 
mistake to think that the past patterns will simply reappear for the agricultural policy and the 
technology have changed since 1945.  These developments must be considered in speculating 
on the future. 
These  two  features  are  reflected  in  the  analysis.  Comparisons  are  made  among 
commodities within the approximate area of the future East Germany to consider changes due 
to  market forces.  Additionally,  comparisons  are  made  to  western  Germany  since after the 
Second World War the agricultural sectors were influenced by fundamentally different economic 
systems. 
It is  important to be clear about  the geographic  terms.  Germany  fluctuated  in  size 
considerably over this period.  By 1945 about one-third of what had been Germany in 1914 was 
lost, mostly in the east.  This analysis uses the terms "western" and "eastern" Germany as they 
are presently used.  That is, in a historical sense what is called eastern Germany was referred 
to as middle Germany before 1945. 
Not surprisingly data availability becomes more limited as the time period of the set is 
extended backward.  For the major grains and potatoes regional data back to 1888 can be found 
while  series  for  other crop  commodities  only  stretch  back  to  the  late  1920's <Statistisches 
Iahrbuch flir ~  Deutsche Reich).  For livestock a few observations were obtained in the pre-
WWI period  -- the  earliest  1883.  The inability to  form  a data  set of consistent  length  and 
commodity coverage limits the type of comparisons that can be done. 
Among the major grains and potatoes various area trends occurred.  Over the 1888 to 
1937  period  on  the  land  that  would  approximately  become  the  Democratic  Republic  (East 
Germany)  wheat,  barley,  and potato area expanded  while rye and oat area fell.  In the late 
1880's wheat area (including spelt) was around 350 thousand hectares.  By the late 1930's wheat 
area had expanded to around 600 thousand hectares -- actually down from the 1932 and  1933 
levels of 712 thousand hectares.  The area devoted to barley expanded as well, but the growth 
was not as large -- from 382 thousand hectares in 1888 to 439 thousand in  1937.  Potato area 
showed a slight increase, going from 717 thousand hectares in  1888 to 850 thousand in 1937. 
As total agricultural land was relatively fixed expanded areas by some crops came at the expense 
of others.  Rye area fell from around  1.5 million hectares in the late 19th century to  1.2-1.3 
million hectares in the late 1930's.  Oat area dropped a bit more than  100 thousand hectares, 
from  838 thousand hectares in  1888 to 715  thousand hectares in 1937.  Other crops,  such as 
pulses, feed root crops, and beans, generally YIelded area to wheat and barley over this period. 
These trends were the result of several long-run forces.  On the demand side there was 
a shift from rye to wheat bread as per capita income rose in Germany following the industrial 
take-off of the  late  19th  century.  There  was  also  a  shift in  the  German  diet toward  meat 
6 associated with per capita income growth which created demand expansion for barley and wheat 
as feeds.  New technology used in livestock feeding placed more reliance on higher quality feeds 
which  again  favored  barley  and  wheat.  The  downtrend  in  oats  reflected  the  increased 
mechanization of  German agriculture.  Oat area expanded until the First World War and the area 
downtrend really appeared in the 1920's and  1930's.  The late 19th and early 20th centuries 
were also a period of rapid biological technical change in German agriculture which affected the 
various crops in different degrees.  Yields for all grains and for potatoes rose.  Wheat remained 
the highest yielding grain and by the late 1930's had slightly increased its advantage over barley. 
Rye and oat yields rose faster than did wheat and barley yields,  yet remained lower.  Potato 
yields roughly doubled. 
Comparing the area in wheat for the regions that would become East and West Germany 
shows differences between the trends for the years leading up to the First World War and those 
afterward.  The trends in the two regions from  1888 to  1914 were the same for barley, rye, 
oats, and potatoes so that the area ratios for the two regions, while fluctuating annually, showed 
no  trend.  However,  the ratio of wheat area in what would become East and West Germany 
showed  a positive trend.  That is,  East German  wheat area was expanding  relative to West 
German wheat area.  After the First World War the East to West German area ratios for all of 
the grains shifted upward but showed no trend during the 1930's.  The regional relationship for 
potatoes was basically unchanged.  Thus, over the period as a whole grain area in the regions 
that would become East Germany expanded relative to that in the future West Germany. 
Interpreting  yield  differences  in  the  two  regions  is  made  difficult  by  their  annual 
variability as well as by their trends due to technical progress.  East and West German rye yields 
from  1888 to 1937 showed no observable difference and the trend was the same.  Oat yields in 
the two regions were the same in the late 19th century.  Data from 1900 to 1914 show that East 
German oat yields lay above West German yields for each year.  The late 1920's and the 1930's 
was a period where great variability occurred in both regions.  In most instances the eastern oat 
yield was  higher.  East German wheat and barley yields consistently exceeded West German 
yields with the advantage increasing until the First World War, but after the war the eastern 
advantage narrowed.  For potato yields the regional data are very similar with a slight advantage 
in the eastern region after the tum of the century. 
Statistical tests confirm these observations.  For the 1888 to 1914 period mean yields in 
the areas that became East Germany were greater for wheat and barley and these differences are 
statistically significant at a 0.5 percent rejection criterion.  The mean eastern potato and oat 
yields are higher,  but the differences  are not statistically  significant.  For rye,  the areas  of 
western Germany have a greater mean, but the difference is not significant.  The results from 
the statistical tests for the 1928-1937 period match those for the other data. 
For sugar beets and rapeseed only regional data for the interwar years were obtained. 
Sugar beet area in the regions that would roughly match East Germany fell from  1928 through 
1932.  Thereafter, area rose and by 1937 was close to the 1928 level.  Rapeseed area which was 
only 4 tnousand hectares also fell to 1932 and 1933.  The National Socialist government adopted 
an  autarkic policy and  subsidized  rapeseed production.  In  1936 and  1937, area reached  20 
thousand and  18 thousand hectares, respectively.  Compared to the areas which became West 
Germany,  East  German  sugar  beet  area  was  fluctuating  greatly  from  1928-1937  with  a 
7 downward trend, yet the east remained the dominant region.  The ratio of East to West German 
rapeseed area from 1930-1937 was more stable and rising.  Yields for both crops in both regions 
were rising.  There was little difference between East and West German rapeseed yields and the 
slightly higher mean yield for the future East Germany was  not statistically significant.  For 
sugar beets the areas in the future West Germany had a yield advantage on average.  At a very 
high level of significance no significant difference was found, but a significant difference did 
exist at a lower level (10 percent). 
For other crops only regional hay data were available over the 1888-1937 period.  The 
hay area in the future East Germany was stable from 1888-1934 at 1030-1050 thousand hectares. 
After 1934 area fell slightly to 975 thousand hectares in 1937.  In the regions that would become 
West  Germany  hay  area expanded  slightly  from  1888  to  1914,  from  3.18 to  3.28 million 
hectares.  From 1928 to 1937 western hay area rose from 3.4 to nearly 3.7 million hectares. 
Hay yields in eastern Germany rose from 1888 into the frrst decade of the. 20th century and then 
stabilized until the First World War.  Yields in the late 1920's were below the pre-war level but 
recovered to old levels in the 1930's.  Western hay yields were higher in 1888 and showed 
expansion to World War I.  They were also lower in the late 1920's but by the 1930's had 
recovered to pre-war levels.  Statistical tests for the 1888-1914 period show a significant mean 
yield advantage for the west existed.  Tests on the later data show  no significant advantage 
existed at an extremely high confidence level, but at a weaker 10 percent level a difference was 
found. 
Data for alfalfa and clover -- 1930-1937 -- show that area fell in both regions with the 
overall percent decline in the west slightly greater.  Yields in the west were on average greater 
and the difference was statistically significant at a weaker confidence level - 10 percent. 
Cattle numbers in East Germany expanded from around 2.6 million head in 1883 to 3.6 
million in 1914. In 1928, the population was about 3.3 million.  It rose back to the 3.6 million 
level in  1933 and 1934, but then fell to 3.2 million head just before the Second World War. 
Compared to the west, the cattle population was stable until the middle 1930's when the western 
population stabilized while that in the east fell. 
The trend in the swine population for eastern Germany was similar to that for cattle --
an expansion prior to WWI, recovery after the war with a peak in 1933 followed by a decline 
just before WWII.  The swine population in the east on the eve of the Second World War was 
roughly the same as the population in 1914.  Compared to the western population,  the east lost 
ground from 1883 to 1914.  During the build-up to 1933 it recovered that loss but surrendered 
it later in the decade. 
Data for poultry also  suggest a relatively weak performance by the areas that would 
become East Germany.  Three data points were found for the pre-WWI years -- 1900, 1907, and 
1912.  Total bird numbers rose from 13.9 million to 17.3 million a percentage increase slightly 
less than that for the west.  From 1928 to 1933 eastern bird numbers rose, but fell afterward to 
show a decline for the period overall.  Populations in the west rose from 1928 to 1937 so that 
after the middle 1930's the share of poultry in the east was falling. 
8 Combining the data for the various commodities and adjusting for the relative size of the 
regions suggests that the agriculture of the areas that would become East Germany was  more 
heavily  weighted  toward  crops  than  the  agriculture  of the  west.  Of Germany  in  1914  --
including regions lost -- what became West Germany constituted 47 percent while the future East 
Germany was 20 percent.  In cattle the western part had from 50-57 percent while the areas of 
the  future  East  Germany  had  but  16  percent.  For swine  numbers  before WWI  a  relative 
advantage for the eastern part had shifted to match relative size by 1914.  In poultry, the west 
had 53 percent versus 21  percent in the future Democratic Republic.  With some modifications 
these livestock patterns continued after the war.  Into the middle 1930's the east gained share 
in swine but lost that share in the late 1930's.  The underrepresentation of eastern Germany in 
cattle was also reflected in the distribution of forage area.  For field crops the region held a 
share that reflected its relative size or exceeded it.  For rye, oats, potatoes, and to some extent 
barley the shares of area in eastern Germany before 1914 were larger than relative size would 
suggest.  For wheat it was underrepresented, but it was gaining share.  In the interwar years the 
area  ratios  for  crops  of the  future  Democratic  Republic  had  generally  risen  and  were 
comparatively  high  for rye,  wheat,  barley,  potatoes,  and  oats.  In the  case of sugar beets, 
although the region contained 23.5 percent of interwar Germany,  it had 40-43 percent of the 
sugar beet area.  Thus, while the entire spectrum of agricultural commodities were produced the 
relative emphasis of the region was on grains, potatoes, and sugar beets. 
The Production Structure of East Gennany 
The purpose of reviewing the production structure of pre-war Germany is to determine 
whether shifts in that pattern occurred under the central planning of the communist government. 
This  part examines briefly the post-war trends  in East German commodity outputs.  It also 
relates those trends to the trends that simultaneously occurred in West Germany.  The argument 
made  is  that  under central  planning  the agriCUltural  sector  in  East  Germany  was  forced  to 
develop a production structure that renounced its traditional patterns. 
The point of departure for the discussion is a summary of the production policy of the 
government of the German Democratic Republic.  A central policy objective was autarky, both 
nationally and regionally within the Democratic Republic (Schrader, Nr. 171172, p. 50).  While 
some goods, such as tropical products, could not be produced and would need to be imported, 
agriculture was expected to cover the basic food needs of the population.  Thus, the potential 
gains from international trade were rejected.  This policy was even pursued down to the regional 
level so that potential gains in regional production specialization within the country were wasted. 
The  central  planning  apparatus  of farm  level  production  plans,  compulsory  output 
deliveries, and state control of  inputs and investment allocations was the instrument to implement 
the autarky policy.  An additional feature of this policy was very high producer prices altered 
to  encourage  the  production  of the  desired  goods  and  subsidized  prices  for  basic  foods. 
Enterprise budgets were soft so that losses could passed through the system to be covered by the 
government.  Profits were diverted to the state through taxes.  Economies of scale,  size,  and 
scope in production were to be captured by socialist enterprises.  First, through collectivization 
and creation of state farms, later via horizontal and vertical integration, and finally by enterprise 
specialization  in  crop  or  livestock  production.  In  concept,  such  scale  economies  and 
9 specialization would lead to production efficiencies whereby producer prices could fall toward 
the subsidized levels paid by consumers. 
An additional feature of the policy environment was the favorable treatment of livestock. 
Livestock self-sufficiency was a high priority and relative prices for livestock commodities were 
managed to encourage output.  Compared to West German livestock - grain price ratios, East 
German producer price ratios  were extremely high.  The consequences of this pro-livestock 
policy combined with regional autarky policy meant a regional diffusion of livestock production 
within  the  Democratic Republic  and  its  separation  from  regional  patterns  based  on  natural 
advantages  (Agra-Europe,  38/90,  Dokumentation  p.  9).  This  would  have  important 
consequences when EC policies were introduced. 
The instruments used and the plans set created a shift in crop area over the 1949 to 1987 
period.  Wheat area rose from 469 thousand hectares in 1949 to 777 thousand hectares in 1989 
(Data used are from Statistisches Iahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Repubik: Statistisches 
Jahrbuch fin: ~  Bundesre.publik Deutschland: ~  Department Qf Agriculture).  Barley area 
rose into the late 1970's - from 253 thousand hectares in 1949 to over 1 million in 1978 -- and 
then fell to around 890 thousand hectares.  As East Germany was deficient in protein feeds, fats, 
and oils, rapeseed area expanded some -- from 67 thousand hectares in  1949 to  148 thousand 
in 1989.  Field crops losing area were rye (from 1.3 million hectares to 620 thousand), oats (530 
to 143  thousand hectares), and potatoes (813 thousand to 431  thousand hectares).  Sugar beet 
area remained  stable as  it varied from  192  thousand  hectares  to  269  thousand  with no clear 
trend. 
Among the various crops the area trends for East Germany differed greatly from those 
trends  occurring in West Germany under  the  Common  Agricultural Policy of the European 
Community and its West German predecessor.  The ratios of East to West German areas for 
wheat and barley had  similar patterns.  During the 1950's these ratios fell because East German 
area was relatively stable.  With the completion of the collectivization process early in 1960, the 
ratios of East to West German wheat and barley areas began a sustained climb lasting to 1989. 
Nevertheless,  except for three years-- 1969,  1976,  1977 -- the ratio for barley lay below the 
interwar relationship.  For wheat, all years had ratios below the interwar years.  Thus, for wheat 
and barley the area ratios in the late 1980's were very similar to those before the First World 
War and were below the interwar period. 
Despite much different trends in East German area for oats and sugar beets, the changes 
in  the  East  to  West  German  area ratios  were  similar.  With  East German  sugar beet area 
stagnate and West German area expanding, the pre-war pattern of a falling area ratio continued. 
Whereas in 1950 East German sugar beet area exceeded West German area by more than  15 
percent, by the late 1980's East German area was less than 60 percent of the area in the Federal 
Republic.  This adjustment was partly due to the price support system offered to sugar in the 
west and partly a result of more rapid technological change in the west.  The ratio of oat areas 
in the two regions was stable before the Second World War, but fell from 1950 to 1979.  Since 
then it rose, but remained well below the earlier levels. 
Although East German potato and rye area fell  sharply since 1949, the rate of decline 
was far less than that for West Germany.  Thus, the East to West area ratio climbed greatly. 
10 For rye, the pre-war ratio fluctuated between 70 and 77 percent with no observable trend.  That 
range basically held true until the late 1960's when it began to climb.  By the early 1980's East 
Germany had around 60 percent more area in rye than did West Germany.  In the 1980's the 
ratio fell some,  and by 1990 the east had only 40 percent more rye hectares than did the west. 
The relationship shift between the regions for potatoes was even more extreme.  From 1888 to 
1937 the area ratio held below 0.7.  In the 1950's it lay between 0.7 and 0.75.  Following 1961 
the ratio began a sustained rise - exceeding 1.0 in 1969,2.0 in 1984, and reaching 2.3 in 1988. 
Thus, at the end of the period of central planning, the Democratic Republic with its autarkic 
policy and its policy of subsidizing basic foodstuffs had more than twice the area in potatoes than 
did the Federal Republic. 
The situation in rapeseed was also shifting radically and reflected the problems that East 
Germany was having with central planning.  East Germany was a deficit region in protein meals, 
in vegetable fats, and in vegetable oils.  This conflicted with its autarkic policy as the supplies 
needed  for  its livestock production  as  well  as  the  population's fat  and  oil needs  had  to  be 
imported from the west using hard currency.  Correspondingly rapeseed area expanded.  Yet that 
expansion was limited by the crushing capacity of the processing industry.  Thus, East Germany 
was  self-sufficient in  rapeseed  production due  to  this capacity limit,  but deficient in  oilseed 
products which had to be imported in large volumes from non-socialist countries using scarce 
hard currency.  Relative to the expansion seen in the west, the increased area in the Democratic 
Republic was small.  In the initial post-war years West Germany sought virtually all its supplies 
of oilseeds, protein meals,  vegetable fats  and oils on the world market and  so  the small East 
German area was many times the level of the west.  A faster rate of area expansion in West 
Germany after 1955 due to price supports and technical change reduced the area ratio.  The ratio 
seen in the 1930's reemerged in the early 1980's and the continued rapid expansion in the west 
under increased EC price supports continued to erode the relative East German position. 
In countries like East Germany where the total land available is relatively constant -- or 
actually falling  - yield growth achieved  via technical change is critical to  expanded output. 
Yield growth not only expands output directly, but also allows shifts in area among crops.  In 
the case of grains, East German yields grew in the post-war period.  Wheat yields in the middle 
1950's lay around 3 tons per hectare and by the middle 1980's were consistently in the 5.5 tons 
per hectare range.  A similar rise occurred for barley - from 2.5-3.0 tons per hectare in the 
1950's to 4.5-5.0 tons in the mid 1980's.  Rye and oat yields also increased but by less.  Rye 
yields went from around 2 tons per hectare to  3.5 tons.  Oat yields rose from 2.0-2.5 tons in 
the 1950's to 3.5-4.5 tons in the 1980's. 
The gains in East German grain yields lagged behind those of West Germany so that in 
contrast to the pre-war pattern East German yields were lower.  For wheat the level of yields 
in the two Germanies were similar until 1970 when a noticeable advantage in favor of the west 
began to appear.  For barley the gap was less clear and in any case was not noticeable until the 
middle 1970's.  Even so the data back to 1888 showed a consistent advantage for East Germany 
in the yields of these  two crops.  For rye and  oats pre-war yields  in  the two  regions  were 
roughly the same, but after the war the west had a consistent advantage -- considerably so for 
rye.  The same pattern occurred for rapeseed. 
11 Even more serious yield growth problems occurred for potatoes and sugar beets.  Potato 
yields in East Germany moved higher -- noticeably in the 1980's -- yet in general were in the 
same range as those of the interwar years.  West German potato yields in contrast always lay 
above  pre-war  levels  and  a  positive  trend  was  apparent.  Sugar  beets  in  East  Germany 
experienced no yield increase after the Second World War and were comparable to the levels 
obtained in the interwar years.  Yields in West Germany,  which during the  1930's exceeded 
those in East Germany, moved considerably higher after the war.  By the end of  the 1980's West 
German yields for sugar beets were 50-75 percent above East German yields. 
There were several sources for the problems encountered in raising East German yields. 
One problem was  slowness in the development and adoption of new  varieties  which  lagged 
behind the technology available in the west.  This slowness has been attributed in part to the lack 
of competition facing seed producers under socialism as well as to the need to improve varieties 
suited to the harsher conditions of the east. Lack of tonnage of fertilizers, herbicides, fungicides 
and insecticides was  not a cause as applications per hectare were well above western levels. 
However, quality was low, application dosages inexact, and timeliness poor so that the overall 
effectiveness of chemical use was low.  The level of mechanization was high, but not always 
appropriately used and often the machinery was antiquated.  Lack of timely field operations and 
excessively heavy machinery led to  soil compaction problems and  yield losses.  Much of the 
problem with yields lay in the excessive size of units,  in  specialization of inflexible labor,  a 
weak  incentive  system,  in  high  transaction  costs,  and  in  communication  and  coordination 
problems.  That is, system related failures in planning and in the organization of  units to execute 
the plans assigned hampered the agricultural performance of East Germany. 
As noted one key policy objective lay in favoring the development of self-sufficiency in 
livestock production.  This objective was met and even exceeded so that East Germany became 
a livestock exporter.  The total  cattle population rose from  2.8 million head  in  1946 to 5.7 
million by 1989.  Milk cows increased rapidly after the war from  1.4 million to 2.1 million in 
1955 and then stabilized at that level so  that over time there was increased emphasis on beef 
production.  Swine numbers recovered quickly after the war -- reaching 5.7 million in 1950. 
Numbers climbed to  13.1  million in  1983 before falling back to  12  million in  1989.  Poultry 
numbers rose from 22.7 million birds in  1950 to 54.4 million in  1981  and stabilized at 49-50 
million afterwards. 
The development of livestock in East Germany compared to  West Germany after the 
Second World War was remarkably different from the historical relationship.  Whereas before 
the war the ratio of East German herds to West German herds was stable or falling, after the 
war East Germany  was  expanding  compared  to  West Germany.  In  1948,  the ratio of East 
German to West German cattle populations was 0.27 -- the historical ratio was 0.29-0.3.  An 
upward trend ensued and the ratio peaked at 0.39 in  1974.  Since that time it has  fluctuated 
between 0.37 and 0.38.  Before the Second World War the East to West German ratio for swine 
tended  to exhibit a downtrend.  As  with cattle,  the  1948  ratio of 0.39 was  in  line with the 
historical level.  The post-war pattern for the swine ratio in East to West Germany differed from 
that of cattle.  The ratio climbed rapidly to nearly 0.7 in 1952 and then fell.  The post-war low 
was reached in 1970 at 0.46 -- roughly the 1892 level which was historically still high.  During 
the 1970-1975 period it again climbed to 0.58 and afterward fluctuated between 0.52 and 0.57. 
Thus, during the post-war period the loss of share relative to western Germany experienced in 
12 the 1883-1914 period was regained.  Poultry exhibited an entirely different pattern.  Only twice -
- 1958 and 1966 - did the East German bird population fall to the historical relationship with 
the population in the west.  The post-war ratio showed a cycle of a trough in the 1950's, a peak 
in 1960 followed by a trough in 1966.  After that time the ratio has been rising with a value of 
around 0.65 in the 1980's versus a historical ratio of 0.4. 
Comparing these trends with those of the pre-WWII years suggests that under central 
planning the East German agricultural sector was pushedin a different direction.  Before the war 
the sector was crop dominated and the output mix was shifting further in favor of crops.  The 
region was the dominant sugar beet producer.  Wheat and barley were expanding at a faster rate 
than in the west.  After the Second World War there was a noticeable shift in East Germany 
towards livestock.  Absolute numbers were rising as were numbers relative to the expansion in 
the west.  Wheat and barley production in East Germany expanded but were behind the levels 
relative to the west when viewed in the context of the interwar years -- more like the early 20th 
century.  Production of  oats was in decline and at a faster rate than in West Germany.  Rapeseed 
production rose but lagged behind the growth  in the west.  Stagnate sugar beet area and yields 
in East Germany  meant that the region's once dominant position over the west disappeared. 
While rye and potato area fell in East Germany, the rate of contraction was slower than in the 
west.  Thus, when the communist regime collapsed the agricultural sector appears to have been 
producing an inappropriate mix of  too much livestock, too much rye and potatoes,  with too little 
wheat, barley, rapeseed, and sugar beets. 
Eastern German Agriculture in a New Environment 
The previous section notes the shift in the East German production structure between the 
pre-war and post-war years.  Yet the reunification of Germany does not guarantee that the pre-
war patterns will reemerge because the environment is different.  Since the Second World War 
agricultural  technology  has  changed  and  the  relationships  between  output  mix  and  natural 
conditions has been altered.  Also the agricultural policy environment has changed as German 
policy has been replaced by EC policy. 
The purpose of this section is to present the changes in the eastern German output mix 
occurring since 1989 as market forces  and EC  rules are introduced and to discuss why those 
changes  occurred.  This  section  is  divided  into  two  parts.  The first  is  a  straightforward 
description of the differences in production structure in 1989, 1990, and 1991.  The second part 
explains why these changes occurred.  Understanding the motives for the changes seen provides 
the foundation for looking into the production structure of the future. 
A Review of 1989, 1990, and 1991 
Each  of the  years  1989,  1990,  and  1991  comprised  different  political,  social,  and 
economic characteristics which must be considered.  The year 1989 was  basically one of the 
central planning regime.  The actual political change occurred in early November following a 
few months of  turmoil-largely reflected in street demonstrations and labor emigration via other 
13 nations.  During 1990 the future situation was unclear and in a state of fluctuation.  Originally 
East German elections were scheduled for early May, then were quickly shifted to March as the 
political situation deteriorated.  The treaty of economic and monetary union was crafted quickly 
and implemented July  1,  1990.  While much of the EC agricultural policy was transferred to 
East Germany, special transition rules through March 1991 were introduced.  Given the political 
situation that summer the operating assumption was that East Germany would continue to exist 
for an uncertain length of time.  Actual events were that the Democratic Republic disappeared 
on October 3, 1990 --some three months after economic union.  Thus,  1991  was the first year 
of a reunited German agricultural sector, yet there continued to be special adjustment assistance 
and investment aids for the region as well as many unresolved issues.  Most of the uncertainty 
in agriculture focused on the procedures for dissolving collective agriculture, on privatizing state 
assets, and on ownership claims.  It should also be recalled that the country as a whole was in 
the process of unprecedented change and that the problems faced by agriculture were mirrored 
in every sector.  Hence, none of the three years can be regarded as normal. 
Although the figures in the tables are preliminary, the short-run directions of the shifts 
in the production pattern for eastern Germany are clear.  Total cropland in  1990 was roughly 
the same as in  1989 while livestock populations fell sharply.  Because the cropland allocation 
decision was set in the fall of 1989 and the spring of 1990 prior to economic union the lack of 
adjustment  in  1990  is  not  surprising.  By  the  fall  of 1990  and  the  spring  of 1991  the 
consequences of economic and political union were being felt and total cropland began to fall, 
mostly due to the introduction of set-aside.  Livestock inventories continued to fall sharply so 
that there was a noticeable shift in the production structure away from livestock. 
Within the crops the production structure changed.  Between 1989 and  1990 grain area 
expanded slightly -- about  1 percent (table 1).  Wheat was  the major grain losing area in the 
1990 crop year -- a loss of just over 2 percent.  Other grains losing area included oats and 
summer mixed grains.  The adjustments from  1990 to  1991  were different.  Grain area in total 
fell-- 14 percent.  Barley area contracted slightly, 3 percent.  Wheat area recovered its earlier 
loss and even rose above the 1989 level.  Rye area in 1991 fell sharply, 47 percent.  Sugar beet 
area fell 7 percent from  1989 to  1990 and then in 1991  a large drop of 18 percent occurred. 
With the new economic environment potato area entered into a severe area contraction -- 22 
percent  down  in  1990  and  a  66  percent  further  loss  in  1991.  Field fodder  crops  initially 
expanded area, but with the decline in livestock area fell sharply in  1991.  The crops with the 
largest area gains in 1990 and 1991 were rapeseed -- stable from 1989 to 1990 and a 121 percent 
increase in 1991 -- and other crops, such as com, sunflower seed, and flaxseed.  Thus, the crop 
area mix  shifted in  favor of wheat,  barley,  oilseeds,  and against rye,  oats,  sugar beets,  and 
potatoes. 
The area adjustments alone do not explain the shifts in production structure because the 
comparatively low crop yields seen for East Germany were expected to rise quickly.  The crop 
production  figures  shown  in  table  1  show  that  this  expected  yield  increase  was  generally 
occurring.  Although wheat area fell slightly from  1989 to 1990, output rose nearly 20 percent. 
The expansion in wheat area for 1991  with continued yield gains raised production another 13 
percent.  A more extreme case occurred for sugar beets where the 7 percent area contraction 
from  1989 to 1990 was associated with a 13 percent rise in output.  Between 1989 and 1990 
14 Table 1:  Crop Area and Production in Eastern Germany,  1989-1991 
Crop  Area  Production 
1989  1990  1991*  1989  1990  1991* 
-- thd hectares -- -- thd metric tons --
Grain total  2459  2478  2131  10814  11833  10150 
Wheat  777  759  789  3477  4189  4721 
Barley  895  920  891  4683  4797  4980 
Rye  624  643  342  2103  2044  1445 
Sugar Beets  217  202  165  6220  7056  6060 
Rapeseed  148  149  329  419  368  947 
Potatoes  431  337  116  9167  6806  2825 
Field Fodder  1081  1098  829 
* Preliminary 
Sources:  BOse and Welschof, p. 2. 
Heberle and Kreitmair, pp. 64-66. 
Table 2:  Yield Developments for Major Crops in Western and Eastern Gemiany, 
1985-1991 
Crop  1985-1990 Average  1990  1991* 
West  East  West  East  West  East 
-- tons per hectare --
"Grains  5.47  4.51  5.79  4.72  6.23  5.47 
Wheat  6.34  5.18  6.66  5.52  7.15  5.99 
Rye  4.34  3.37  4.71  3.18  5.07  4.22 
Barley  5.09  4.88  5.43  5.22  5.78  5.59 
Oats  4.39  3.93  4.53  4.26  5.03  4.38 
Rapeseed  3.11  2.71  3.03  2.46  3.20  2.88 
Potatoes  35.49  23.95  34.27  20.19  31.92  24.32 
Sugar Beets  52.53  31.43  57.43  34.89  50.04  36.71 
* Preliminary 
Source:  Heberle and Kreitmair, pp. 64-66. 
15 barley area rose more than did output while rapeseed and rye output fell despite the rise in area. 
This  was  due  to  an  abnormally  dry  conditions.  Data  for  rye  for  1991  shows  a  yield 
improvement occurred as  1991  yields were above the  1985  - 1990 average  (table 2).  Yield 
problems continued for rapeseed as  the yield recovered only to slightly above the 1985 - 1990 
average for East Germany  -- again  1991  was  unusually dry.  Thus,  for the crop production 
figures  shown  in table  1 there was  a  shift in  the production  mix  toward  wheat,  barley,  and 
rapeseed.  Sugar beet production varied in the same range, while potato and rye output fell. 
Given  the  annual  variation  in  yields,  the  few  observations  provide  very  limited 
information upon which to anticipate the future.  Indeed the late summer of 1991 was dry while 
the  spring  and  early  summer  had  been  cool.  Comparatively  little  moisture  had  also  been 
received  in major areas in 1990.  Table 2 shows  the different yield  developments for major 
crops and compares them with western Germany.  For eastern Germany  most grain yields rose 
considerably through 1991 while rapeseed and potato yields showed slight gains.  The yield for 
total grains in 1991 was just over 21 percent greater than the 1985 - 1990 average.  The largest 
percentage gain was made by rye yields, followed by wheat, barley, and oats.  Sugar beet yields 
which had not risen significantly since the Second World War experienced nearly a 17 percent 
increase.  Following the  poor performance in  1990 due to  weather rapeseed  yields in  1991 
recovered to record a gain of  just over 6 percent.  Yield growth for potatoes was slow after the 
Second World War and this situation continued as compared to the 1985 - 1990 average the 1991 
yield was  1.5 percent greater. 
As  noted,  before the Second  World War eastern  yields  were at or exceeded  western 
yields, except for sugar beets, and that in the post-war years the relationship shifted against the 
east.  This situation is reflected in the 1985 - 1990 average figures.  By the 1990 crop season 
the disadvantage for the east had narrowed for all crops,  with the exception of oats, due to a 
more rapid rise in yields in eastern Germany with economic reform.  The most rapid narrowing 
of the gap occurred for sugar beets and for potatoes, in that order.  These were the crops in 
which the post-war yield developments had  lagged the most.  Yet an  examination of the data 
shows that compared to the 1985 - 1990 average western yields were down in 1991  so that the 
extent of closing the gap may  be overstated.  The west-east yield gap for rye also narrowed 
sharply  between  the  two  periods  while  the  gaps  for  the  other  crops  showed  more  modest 
declines.  Nevertheless, a substantial gap remained for most crops, outside of barley, which the 
pre-war data suggests should not be the case.  Hence,  a further narrowing of the gap can be 
expected. 
The state differences in yields reflected the predominate natural conditions (table 3).  For 
grains,  Brandenburg  with  its  sandy  soils  had  the  lowest yield  in  each  year.  Mecklenburg-
Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt also have large areas with poor soils so yields tended to be below 
average.  Because  Saxony-Anhalt  contains  richer  soil  on  average  the  1989  relationship  to 
Mecklenburg was unusual and in the subsequent  years  the grain yield  for Saxony-Anhalt lay 
above that for Mecklenburg-Pomerania.  Above average yields were recorded consistently for 
the more southern states with their better soil types.  A somewhat different pattern appeared for 
oilseeds where Mecklenburg-Pomerania dominated.  This reflected  the fertile coastal region. 
Again Saxony had a consistently strong yield performance in these three years.  Saxony-Anhalt 
showed more yield variation than did other regions as its rainfall in  some areas is strongly 
16 Table 3:  Eastern German Grain and Oilseed Yields by State,  1989-1991 
Year  Mecklenbg  Brandenbg  Saxony  Saxony  Thuringia  Average 
Pomerania  Anhalt 
-- tone per hectare --
Grains: 
1989  4.63  3.52  4.27  5.11  4.89  4.40 
1990  4.66  3.70  4.72  5.77  5.48  4.72 
19911  5.67  4.66  5.73  5.60  5.68  5.46 
Oilseeds: 
1989  3.28  2.20  1.64  2.55  2.21  2.70 
1990  2.67  2.07  1.77  2.30  2.08  2.35 
19911,2  2.94  2.61  2.88  2.88  2.18  2.75 
1  Estimated in the summer of 1991  and differs from date in Table 2. 
2  Only rapeseed so implies a small overestimate. 
Source:  lsermeyer, p. 295. 
17 influenced by the Harz mountains.  In the first two years it suffered the lowest yields, while the 
1991  expected yield was above average. 
The livestock inventory adjustments in 1990 and 1991 were large and negative (table 4). 
In the first year cattle numbers fell 14 percent -- milk cows, 16 percent.  Swine numbers were 
27 percent lower, layers down 28 percent, and sheep 44 percent.  The decline in cattle numbers 
slowed from 1990 to 1991, but that for milk cows continued to be large -- 16.9 percent.  The 
reductions in populations of swine and layers between 1990 and 1991 also continued to be strong 
-- 25.6 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively.  Sheep numbers continued to fall, but at a slower 
rate. 
The liquidation of milk cows  was  reflected in the  milk deliveries  to  eastern  German 
processors and  cheese production figures  (table 5).  From 1989  to  1990 milk deliveries fell 
almost 7 percent with the reduction concentrated  in the period after economic union.  Third 
quarter deliveries were down  14 percent and  fourth quarter deliveries more than 20 percent. 
The  continued  decline  in  milk  cows  into  1991  caused  a  31  percent  decline  in  1991  milk 
deliveries.  The quarterly cheese production figures showed weakness as early as the first quarter 
of 1990, but as with milk deliveries the decline after July 1990 was very severe.  For the year 
1990 the cheese output decline was  43  percent.  That decline also continued into 1991  -- 57 
percent -- so that compared to 1989 cheese output in 1991  was 76 percent lower. 
The livestock inventory liquidation also affected meat outputs with the differing impacts 
reflecting characteristics of the livestock type (table 6).  Herd reductions meant an increase in 
meat output followed by a decline as the reduced numbers worked through the marketing system. 
For animal types with short production cycles the drop in animal numbers was quickly reflected 
in meat output declines.  Poultry have the shortest production cycle and output fell in 1990 by 
16 percent for poUltry meat and  15 percent for eggs.  Pork output due to the longer cycle for 
swine fell 2 percent.  The longest production cycle is for cattle and the herd liquidation resulted 
in an increase of 30 percent for 1990. 
Causes of the Adjustments Underway 
The adjustments described were the result of the interaction of several forces.  These 
forces  can  be categorized  into those  which  affected  all  commodities  and  those  which  were 
specific to a particular commodity or group of commodities.  This part discusses the influences 
of these forces on the eastern German agricultural production structure. 
One force behind the observed adjustments was  the poor condition of the agricultural 
sector at the end of the communist period.  Enterprises -- collective and  state farms -- were 
poorly organized and run.  The size of units was considered excessive with high transaction costs 
and this contributed to inefficiency.  The enterprises were more like rural communities than 
farms in a western sense and hence had many of the non-agricultural functions of  a community. 
The enterprises were overstaffed with labor and that labor lacked incentives for efficiency gains. 
Furthermore the labor was specialized by task and could not be shifted among activities. Capital 
on these enterprises was also inadequate.  Investment in the sector had been neglected during 
the 1980's in an effort to save foreign exchange and to limit international debt.  The capital that 
18 Table 4:  Livestock Populations in Eastern Germany,  1989-1991 
Livestock Type  1989  1990  1991* 
-- thd. head --
Cattle  5724  4927  4750 
Milk Cows  2000  1685  1400 
Swine  12013  8742  6500 
Sheep  2603  1448  1300 
Poultry  49270 
Layers  24866  17934  15020 
*  Estimates in the summer of 1991. 
Source:  BOse and Welschof. p. 3. 
Table 5:  Eastern German Milk Deliveries and Cheese Production by Quarter,  1989-
1991 
Quarter  Milk Deliveries to Dairies  Cheese Production 
19891  19901  1991  19891  19901  1991 
-- thd.  tons --
I  1788.4  1888.8  61.1  56.3 
2  2210.6  2223.4  }  281()2  63.6  49.5 
3  2002.5  1722.6  66.7  20.4 
4  1774.7  1412.8  }  2176.3  57.0  12.8 
Total  7776.2  7247.6  4986.33  242.9  139.1  59.5
3 
1  LOsch,  p. 48. 
2  Based on A&ra-Euro.pe,  48/91, Kurzmeldungen, p. 5. 
3  Based on Agra-Europe, 50/91, Markt + Meinung p.  13. 
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20 existed was old and labor intensive which contributed to low productivity.  Investment that had 
been made was often based on ideological grounds in terms of location and type.  For example, 
milk facilities had to be of a large size to receive investment based on supposed economies of 
scale.  Those proposing a smaller unit were denied investment.  Successful enterprises were 
required to tum over much of the profit to the state which then diverted the funds  to weaker 
units, thus, precluding their investment.  Many enterprises at the end of the communist period 
were burdened with old debts and unresolved ownership claims on their assets which hindered 
new investment.  Farm level analysis of collective enterprises suggested losses for most farms 
under EC market conditions without major changes in input allocation and production structure 
(Weinschenk, et al, p. 4). 
This  situation  resulted  in  attempts  by  farms  to  cuts  costs,  particularly  labor  costs. 
Because  the old, labor-intensive livestock facilities were associated with higher labor costs than 
were crop operations there was a tendency to reduce livestock output faster (Weinschenk, et al, 
p.  4).  Furthermore,  the existing  large  livestock  facilities  could  not  as  easily  be privatized 
through  subdivision so  there  was  a tendency  to curtail operations of entire bams with  large 
numbers.  There was also a tendency to downsize operations to reduce average costs, especially 
transaction costs.  Non-revenue producing activities associated with community functions were 
discontinued.  Again, relatively labor-intensive operations, such as livestock and potatoes, were 
curtailed.  The financial problems of the enterprises also created a desire to generate liquidity 
through livestock inventory reductions, participation in land set-aside, and leasing or sale of the 
better land to outside interests. 
Another general factor facing the sector early was the difficulty of finding market outlets. 
One reason was the rejection of eastern German goods by consumers  (BOse,  p.  3).  The first 
weeks of economic union saw  a massive shift of consumer demand  to western goods -- even 
when homogeneous.  This was compounded by the defective marketing and processing sector. 
The livestock processing sector suffered from excess labor and old, worn-out, labor intensive 
facilities.  Few plants were able to meet the sanitary conditions of the EC. Lack of quality and 
variety  in  livestock products  was  a  major  problem  for  eastern  German  producers.  Thus, 
consumers turned to the now available western goods.  By the spring of 1991  the demand for 
eastern goods by eastern Germans had begun to recover, yet eastern German products continued 
to have a negative market image for many western German consumers. 
A  series  of general  problems  for  eastern  German  agriculture  stemmed  from  the 
macroeconomic forces at work,  particularly the economic union with the west.  One problem 
was  the linkage between the western and eastern labor markets and  the way  the linkage was 
handled (Sinn and Sinn, pp. 140-148).  With a joint labor market wage levels in the east would 
be expected to rise and those in the west to fall due to labor movements until an equilibrium was 
reached.  With flexible wages, factor productivity and employment in both eastern and western 
Germany  would  remain  in  balance.  The actual  situation  was  that  wages  were  not  flexible 
downward and labor unions were allowed to negotiate large wage increases in eastern Germany 
virtually  unopposed,  in  part with  the  support  of western  unions.  Western  unions  had  no 
incentive to encourage the development of a low wage structure in the east which was  more 
appropriate to the productivity of that labor. Thus, wage increases in the east outstripped any 
conceivable productivity gains.  To be competitive, labor costs had to be reduced.  This could 
be done in  the long-run through  improved productivity arising  from  new capital investment, 
21 technical change,  and retraining.  In the short-run it meant releasing labor.  Agriculture was 
affected  along  with  other sectors.  Discussions  with  some  farmers  indicated  that wage  costs 
between fall 1989 and spring 1991 had more than doubled.  Farmers also consistently reported 
labor reductions of around one-half --largely by discontinuing labor intensive operations like 
livestock. 
Economic union also resulted in an implicitly overvalued currency for eastern Germany. 
In parallel markets before economic union,  the eastern  mark traded at a substantial discount. 
Currency conversion occurred at a two to one rate with major exclusions, including wages and 
prices, where a one to  one rate was  adopted. This in effect was an export tax and an import 
subsidy. The relative price of tradeable goods fell and these sectors were squeezed further due 
to rising wages.  This also meant a fall in the rental rate for capital which slowed the needed 
new investment. The output composition of the economy shifted against traded goods as well as 
against labor-intensive goods. Thus, agricultural production was hurt in general and within the 
sector livestock output was damaged more than crops output because it was relatively more labor 
intensive.  A further impact was that old debts were also converted at full value while output 
prices were pushed lower, thereby,  squeezing farms with old debts incurred in the communist 
period. 
Another feature of the economic union was  the transfer of EC  market rules to eastern 
Germany.  While  EC  commodity  support prices  meant  that  the  sector  was  spared  the  full 
adjustment  to world prices,  EC  producer prices  were  nevertheless  well below East  German 
levels (Schrader, Die Weltwirtschaft, p.  136).  West German prices were 30-60 percent below 
those of East Germany so  that the immediate effect of adopting western prices in conjunction 
with the currency conversion would be a halving of income for the enterprises without other 
adjustments.  Former profits of 2000 marks per hectare were expected to convert into equivalent 
sized losses (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  February 20,  1990, p.  15).  Thus, there was  a 
serious price-cost squeeze for enterprises (Agra-Europe,  29/92, Underberichte p.  26).  This 
adjustment was not commodity neutral.  Based on  1988, East German crop prices lay 1.9 times 
the western level and livestock prices 2.8 times those in the west (Bose, p. 3).  These differences 
reflected  both  the  East  German  autarky  policy  as  well  as  the  pro-livestock bias  of policy. 
Adjustments to EC prices resulted in a relative price shift away from livestock. 
Thus,  the sector burdened with an inefficient organization, antiquated technology, low 
productivity, a worn-out capital stock, large debts, and unclear ownership claims was faced with 
a serious price-cost squeeze.  This resulted from  rising labor costs, an inappropriate currency 
conversion, and from  the transfer of EC policy.  Immediately on economic union there was a 
rejection of eastern produced goods by consumers. The effect was to lower output in general for 
the sector and to shift it away from livestock in favor of crops. 
For individual commodities there were specific forces  which influenced the adjustment 
process.  In the case of sugar beets the pre-war data showed that the areas that became East 
Germany were the major sugar beet producing regions.  This suggests  that eastern Germany 
might have expanded sugar beet area,  but the observed adjustment was a contraction of area. 
A major cause of this adjustment was the introduction of the EC sugar production quota system 
into eastern Germany.  The production quota was based on the 1989 level for East Germany and 
was set initially at 847000 tons or about a 20 percent increase (Schrader, Nr.  1711172, p. 20). 
22 Quotas in subsequent years were to be divided according to a 1984/85-1988/89 reference period. 
As noted East German sugar beet yields did not rise in the post-war period and the 1989 yield 
was  roughly the same as the 1932 yield.  The expectation was  that due to the introduction of 
western technology and improvements in farm efficiency sugar beet yields would rise quickly 
under market forces.  Thus,  the quota level would require an  area reduction  (Schrader,  Nr. 
1711172 , p. 50).  This indeed happened as seen in tables 1 and 2.  The greatest post-war yield 
for East Germany was 35 tons per hectare in 1987.  That level was nearly matched in 1990/91 
and yields continued to expand in 1991192.  With the division of the quota regions with the 
strongest yield performance were most severely affected. 
Several  forces  operated  to  favor  other crops.  Crops  had  a  comparatively  favorable 
starting position in terms of costs and returns (Bose and Welschof, p.  1).  One reason for the 
expectation that crops would more quickly become competitive was  that labor costs were less 
difficult to reduce because of labor-saving machinery (Weinschenk, et al, p. 4).  The machinery 
was  often  old,  but  was  useful  and  its  replacement  could  be  stretched  over  several  years 
(Schrader,  Nr.  1711172  p.  20).  Machinery  could  also  be  divided  relatively  easily  among 
collective members and investment aids programs facilitated purchase of new equipment. 
While the liquidation of enterprises led to forced  sales which pressured grain markets, 
steps were taken to ease the pressure (pock and Kreitmair, p. 89),  As noted crop prices did not 
have to fall as much as did livestock prices to reach EC support levels.  Intervention purchases 
and  export  subsidies  were  quickly  introduced  to  support  the  market.  An  annual  set-aside 
program with a premium of 500-750 DM per hectare was introduced.  Unlike the situation in 
other parts of the European Community potato area could be set-aside which gave support to 
crop prices (Schrader, Nr. 1711172, p. 21).  The level of the set-aside premiums relative to costs 
and the need for liquidity by farms meant that participation in the program was very attractive 
(Schrader, Nr. 1711172, p. 50).  For eastern Germany as a whole 12.8 percent of area was set-
aside in 1990/91 -- 19.2 percent in Brandenburg -- which was a considerable cut in the region's 
production capacity (table 7).  The comparable figure for western Germany was 4.1 percent. 
The incentive to participate in the 1991192 crop year was also strong but the differences between 
the two parts of Germany was less extreme.  Also in the east, states with generally poorer soils 
and with fewer restructured farms,  such as Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Pomerania, tended 
to have more set-aside.  The results of these efforts were that while initially crop prices were 
under great pressure, they relatively quickly stabilized at western German levels.  On average 
for  1991  eastern  German  grain  producers  faced  no  price  disadvantage  over  their  western 
counterparts (lsermeyer, p. 295). 
Another effect of the policy was that the land price was artificially supported above the 
competitive return (Schrader, Nr. 1711172, p. 50).  This had the potential of affecting the future 
structure of the sector by discouraging production of commodities which required a low land 
price to be profitable. 
As indicated by the adjustments the conditions were not uniform for all crops.  The price 
adjustments to EC levels differed by crop and this led to relative price shifts.  Table 8 gives the 
adjustments in the gross margin by crop for four enterprises located on unfavorable areas due 
to adoption of western German prices with  1989  technology.  The changes in gross margins 
correspond roughly to the observed changes in area in area and production.  The least severe 
23 Table 7:  Set-Aside of Crop Area in Germany by State,  1990/91 and 1991/92 
1990/91  1991/92 
State  TotaP  Share of Area2  5-Year  I-Year  Total  Share of Area2 
thd. ha.  percent  -- thd. ha.  -- percent 
Old States 
Schleswig 
Holstein  24.7  4.3  27.7  4.5  32.2  5.6 
Lower 
Saxony  84.0  4.9  101.9  28.2  130.1  7.6 
Hesse  28.8  5.6  41.1  2.6  43.7  8.5 
Rhineland 
Palatinate  22.0  5.1  31.5  4.7  36.2  8.5 
Baden 
Wurttemberg  37.7  4.5  45.6  3.8  49.4  5.9 
Bavaria  71.1  3.4  86.2  7.8  93.9  4.5 
Saarland  1.1  2.8  1.6  0.9  2.5  6.4 
North Rhine 
Westphalia  29.4  2.7  37.8  7.7  45.5  4.2 
Total  299.8  4.1  374.4  60.3  434.6  6.0 
New States 
Brandenburg  207.3  19.2  20.0  91.3  111.3  10.3 
Mecklenburg  3 
Pomerania  144.0  12.7  77.1  77.1  6.8 
Saxony  66.0  8.7  18.5  18.4  36.9  4.9 
Saxony-Anhalt  123.9  11.8  48.6  55.4  103.9  9.9 
Thuringia  57.2  8.7  17.8  12.5  30.3  4.6 
Total  599.2  12.8  104.9  254.6  359.5  7.7 
Germany  899.1  7.5  142.4  314.9  794.2  6.6 
1  A 5-year EC program for the old states and a I-year special program for the new states. 
2  Share calculated based on 1990 crop area. 
3  A 5-year program was not offered. 
Source:  Fasterding, p.  87. 
24 Table 8:  Gross Margins by Crops on Unfavorable Areas Due to Price Changes
l 
Crop  East German Prices 
Marks per ha
2 
Winter Rye  860.41 
Winter Wheat  1908.86 
Summer Wheat  725.44 
Winter Barley  767.67 
Summer Barley  435.77 
Triticale  769.91 
Rapeseed  1767.37 
Potatoes  3887.05 
1  Based on 1989 conditions. 
2  East German marks. 
West German Prices 


















.3338 downward adjustment in gross margin is shown for rapeseed and that crop has sharply expanded 
area and production.  The fall in gross margin for wheat is somewhat greater than for rapeseed -
- wheat area fell 2.3 percent from  1989 through 1990 but recovered in 1991  for a 1.5 percent 
gain compared to 1989.  Meanwhile output rose 35.8 percent.  Barley shows a more severe drop 
in gross  margin than wheat and area fell  from  1989 to  1991  despite an  initial rise in  1990. 
Barley output rose slightly -- 6.3 percent.  The largest downward adjustment is shown for rye -
- its area fell 45 percent from 1989 to  1991  and output dropped 31.3 percent. 
. 
The indicated adjustment in the gross margin for potatoes does not fit the observed area 
decline.  The gross margin ratio for potatoes is 0.33 -- an adjustment in the middle of those 
shown.  Yet area fell the most from  1989 to  1991  -- 73 percent.  Thus, other forces were at 
work.  In East Germany both food  and feed  use of potatoes were very high and these were 
expected to drop (Scholz, p. 5).  Food use would shift away from potatoes and towards higher 
quality foods.  Feed use would be reduced by  a substitution of other feedstuffs and via the fall 
in livestock numbers.  Furthermore, East German potato yields lagged West German yields and 
as that gap narrowed less area was needed to produce the required output. 
The set-aside program also affected the crop relationships.  The fall in total crop area was 
strongly related to the set-aside.  Including the set-aside in the total area shows that from 1989 
to 1991 total area was hardly changed.  Among the grains, rye was the strongest affected (BOse 
and Welschof, p. 2).  This was reflected in the large set-aside for Brandenburg with its sandy 
land.  In eastern Germany potato were also included in the set-aside program which caused a 
reduction in that crop's area. 
One of the early observed adjustments to the introduction of market forces was the rapid 
liquidation of large numbers of livestock.  In addition to the general forces affecting the sector 
which tended to work against livestock in particular, there were a number of factors specific to 
the eastern German livestock industry.  These included:  defective capital, over-sized units, a 
defective marketing system, low factor productivity, a deteriorating price-cost margin, and the 
introduction of milk quotas (Agra-Euro.pe,  38/90, Dokumentation pp. 3, 4, 6). 
Of the  existing  livestock  facilities  in  eastern  Germany  few  were  suited  by  size, 
technology,  and  condition  to  the  needs  of  a  market  economy  (Agra-Europe,  45/91, 
Underberichte p.  28).  One factor was  age  and  labor-intensity.  A substantial  share of the 
facilities stemmed from  the  1950's and  1960's and had  not been upgraded.  The labor use in 
these facilities was very high and at an assumed wage of 15  DM per hour many units would 
need to be retired.  The expectation was that employment would need to be halved (Weinschenk, 
et al, p. 4).  To retain livestock in this new environment most facilities would need rebuilding 
or replacement which was difficult for enterprises with old debts and acute cash flow problems 
(Agra-Europe, 45/91, Underberichte p. 28). 
Another problem with eastern German livestock units was size.  While increased size 
offers economies of scale and the potential for gains from specialization, eastern German sizes 
were excessive.  The size of units created increased organizational problems and mistakes in 
decision  making.  Size and concentration in facilities  with limited land raised feed  expenses, 
caused manure disposal problems, and created health difficulties for the animals.  Labor use in 
these  facilities  was  excessive  (Agra-Europe,  38/90,  Dokumentation pp.  6-7).  Furthermore, 
26 privatization was a problem for the large facilities.  Whereas land could be privatized in various 
sized units, a 400 cow dairy barn remained exactly that.  If  former state and collective farm 
members could have obtained the capital needed to buy and renovate these large facilities more 
would  likely  have  stayed  in operation.  But former  members  of socialist agriculture lacked 
experience and collateral to obtain the necessary finances.  Given their liquidity problems they 
were unable to finance investment from  their own resources.  Additionally,  as  East German 
livestock enterprises were generally without the land needed for manure disposal, acquisition of 
such land also had to be financed. 
The eastern German livestock industry also suffered from a weak processing, marketing, 
and distribution system.  The chain moving the livestock from the farm gate to the consumer 
suffered the same bottlenecks as the economy in general.  Organizationally the firms were weak 
and inefficient.  The capital stock was old, worn-out, and labor-intensive.  Processing plants 
were generally not capable of meeting western quality standards and offered limited varieties of 
products.  In  contrast,  crop  products  could  be  more  easily  transported  west  to  offset  the 
difficulties faced by that processing sector.  Faced with competition from  the west following 
economic union sales of livestock products collapsed (BOse,  p. 6). 
Livestock producers faced an extreme price-cost squeeze.  Per unit costs were high due 
to their inefficiency, to their production factor costs, and to old debts carried, while adjustment 
to EC prices cut returns.  Cattle showed a negative return of 432 marks per animal while swine 
had a  negative 33  mark return (Bose and Welschof, p.  1).  Livestock slaughter was  used  to 
generate liquidity (Isermeyer, p. 295).  Distress slaughter combined with a collapse in demand 
created severe price pressure.  This led to heavier weights and then to further price pressure 
(pock and  Kreitmaier,  p.  89).  Compared  to  crop products  the  fall  in livestock prices  was 
greater and of longer duration -- extending well into 1991.  Whereas by mid  1991 grain prices 
had stabilized near western levels, prices for meat and milk in eastern Germany averaged below 
those in western Germany with large regional differences (Isermeyer, p. 295). 
Compounding the problem was the introduction of EC milk quotas.  Milk quotas were 
introduced in two steps.  First, there was a guaranteed quantity eligible for price support through 
March 31,  1991  which was 8 percent below the  1989 level.  This was part of the treaty of 
economic union which provided for  minimum prices for sensitive commodities like meat and 
milk.  Excess quantities were sold at a much lower price.  After April 1,  1991, EC milk market 
rules were in force with milk deliveries at 80 percent of those in 1989 (Schrader, Nr. 1711172, 
p.  20).  The 20 percent  reduction  in  milk deliveries  meant a  30 percent cut in  output for 
individual producers because the state governments built a  10 percent reserve of quota rights 
which they controlled for distribution (Heiber, p. 68).  The reserve was to be given to producers 
who in 1989 had unusually low output, to reprivatized operations, or to special heifer breeding 
units. 
Besides the direct output cutting impacts of the quotas, they compounded the adjustment 
problems in eastern Germany through their implementation.  Like the sugar quotas they were 
output calculated so that increased milk yields through improved efficiency meant a sharper cut 
in  milk cow  numbers.  The quotas  were  set regionally  on  the basis of 1989  output.  That 
regional output reflected the misallocation of  production due to the East German regional autarky 
policy.  Unlike other EC regions, the quotas were not tradeable or able to be leased (Schrader, 
27 Nr.  1711172,  p.  20).  Thus,  the regional  misallocations of 1989  could  not be overcome by 
trading quotas.  Areas which had a potential advantage in dairy were prevented from expanding 
while other regions less suited to dairy were pressured that direction. 
The Future Agricultural Production Structure of Eastern Germany 
The purpose of this analysis is to draw a picture of the future production structure of 
eastern Germany under market forces.  For that purpose three sets of information are presented. 
The first is a review of the production structure of the sector before the Second World War and 
how it related  to  that in  the  west.  Thereafter  the  paths  taken  by  the  eastern  sector  under 
communist central planning and  the  west  under EC  policy are discussed.  Finally the initial 
adjustments as market forces were introduced is considered.  While the actual outcome in the 
future will be strongly influenced by agricultural policy--notably EC  reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy--some general patterns can be forecast. 
Before the Second World War the areas which would become :Eastern  Germany were 
more focused on crop production than western regions while the role of  livestock in the west was 
greater:  The location of the livestock was also reflected in land devoted to pasture.  Among the 
crops there were also differences in pre-war patterns.  For rye, oats, potatoes and to some extent 
for barley, the future East Germany was  overrepresented based on size.  For wheat,  Eastern 
Germany was underrepresented based on relative size.  In the case of  sugar beets, the future :East 
Germany was dominant. 
Another conclusion from  the pre-WWII data was that the relative crop orientation was 
in general strengthening.  Over the  1883 to  1937 period the relative share of swine in  ":East" 
versus  "West"  Germany was clearly falling.  The shares for cattle and poultry were stable--
falling some in the 1930's.  The relative shares of East Germany for wheat and barley area were 
rising.  The ratios of rye, oats, and potato areas in the two regions showed no trend.  The short 
data series for sugar beets, in contrast, showed a falling share for the :East. 
Pre-war crop yield comparisons of the two regions showed equal or greater yields in the 
east, except for sugar beets. Consistent yield advantages for the future :East Germany could be 
seen for wheat and barley.  The other crops showed generally equal levels of yields. 
The post-war data --1949-1989--exhibited a much different set of  trends.  The communist 
government pursued a regional autarky policy combined with a pro-livestock bias in its plan. 
This pushed the production structure the opposite direction from the pre-war picture.  Compared 
to West Germany, East German livestock populations rose.  For crop areas the post-war trends 
in East Germany relative to West Germany were also different than  the pre-war years.  The 
ratios for wheat and barley areas in :East and West Germany exhibited a rising pattern just as 
before.  Yet the post-war level of the ratios were far below those seen in the 1928-1937 period--
more like the 1888-1914 years.  Oats and rapeseed illustrated a sharp decline in their area ratios 
which were counter to the pre-war period.  In sugar beet area East Germany lost its absolute 
dominance in  1951.  Although :East  German  rye and  potato areas  were falling,  the rates  of 
declines were far less that West German rates. 
28 Yield comparisons also showed great differences between pre and post-war data.  For 
wheat and barley where East Germany held a pre-war yield advantage, slower growth resulted 
in a slight yield disadvantage in the 1970's and  1980's.  For other crops where there had been 
no regional difference before the war, East Germany lost ground.  Sugar beet yields were the 
most  extreme example.  Whereas  West German  yields  nearly  doubled,  East German  yields 
remained in the range seen during the 1930's. 
The initial adjustment to market forces  was  in general toward the patterns seen before 
the Second World War - in favor of crops and against livestock.  Total crop area remained 
roughly  the same while large reductions  in  numbers  of all livestock types occurred.  These 
adjustments were the result of  several forces.  At the macroeconomic level the joint labor market 
with  western  Germany  and  the  currency  conversion  were  less  disruptive  to  crops  than  to 
livestock.  The relative price adjustments needed to bring East German prices down to EC levels 
also favored crop commodities over livestock.  While both crop and livestock enterprises had 
defective  capital  stocks  and  organizational  structures,  the  efficiency  problems  in  livestock 
enterprises  were comparatively  more  severe.  The imposition of milk quotas  also  hampered 
livestock. 
Within the crops the trends of East Germany which had run counter to developments in 
the  west  were quicldy  reversed.  Thus,  area  for  rye and  potatoes  contracted  sharply.  For 
potatoes  this  area  contraction  was  accelerated  by  the  set-aside.  In  this  area  reallocation, 
rapeseed benefitted greatly.  Wheat and barley areas remained about the same level, while output 
rose due to yield gains.  Developments in  sugar beets were the opposite of what would have 
been predicted based only on the historical comparison as area has not expanded.  This reflects 
the imposition of BC output quotas which limit the production rise and the rise in yields. 
In regard to the longer run production patterns the information suggests some hypotheses. 
First,  the  role  of livestock  in  the  areas  of the  former  Democratic  Republic  will  diminish 
compared  to  that  seen  in  the  1950-1989  period.  This  shift is  consistent  with  the  pre-war 
situation and is shown in the early adjustments.  It  also reflects with the continuing dairy surplus 
problems of the European Community and attempts by the EC to control that problem.  Yet it 
is also possible that the large herd  reductions  of the past two  years were excessive and  that 
livestock could experience some recovery.  Eastern  Germany  has  no  natural disadvantage in 
livestock production and has some potential advantages.  One advantage is its thin population 
density.  Land is potentially available at low cost.  Conditions in many regions are favorable for 
the development of extensive livestock operations in  conjunction with feed  crops (lsermeyer, 
12/91, pp. 305). 
How this unfolds depends on  agricultural policy.  A future livestock industry requires 
new capital investment, but present investment aids programs limit investment for livestock and 
livestock facilities.  Furthermore the collateral needed  to  access  the investment aids  that are 
provided is limited and current farmers face severe liquidity problems which limit own capital 
formation.  Another  factor  is  that the  facilities  need  to be of sizes  which  are efficient and 
capable of generating an adequate income.  The existing facilities are too large for use by the 
emerging private farmers and livestock facilities are not easily subdivided.  Through April 1991, 
with the exception of  poultry, livestock continued to remain largely in large units.  The poultry 
flock distribution reflected the large private holdings in East Germany.  These larger units were 
29 either  cooperatives,  corporate  farms,  or unrestructured  collectives  and  concerns  about  the 
sustainability of these cooperative forms have been raised.  If  the farm structure is forced by 
policy  to become one of small farms  or if the present large organizations cannot compete, 
recovery of livestock in eastern Germany will be hampered by the existing large facilities.  A 
structure  of small  livestock  producers  as  practiced  in  western  Germany  would  require  a 
completely new set of facilities which would be difficult to finance. 
Recovery of the livestock industry will also be conditional on upgrading the processing, 
marketing, and distribution system.  Privatization of slaughter plants, meat and milk processing 
factories through 1991 has been slow.  Without adequate processing recovery in livestock will 
not be likely.  To some extent new cooperatives are adopting a strategy of vertical integration 
in the livestock sector to fill this deficiency.  At this point their success in competition with 
established western packers remains problematic. 
Also agricultural policy needs to be more flexible even if it remains restrictive overall. 
Policy must allow specialization in livestock production by regions which have a comparative 
advantage in that activity.  There are regions in eastern Germany which have few alternatives 
to livestock.  Until now, the milk quota system has hampered this development.  Another critical 
feature for a successful livestock sector is the land price.  The present policy of long-term leases 
for  state-owned  land  rather  that  sale  of that  land  gives  the  appearance  of trying  to  limit 
downward adjustment in land prices.  This could hinder the recovery of livestock in eastern 
Germany. 
Total crop area is likely to shrink as marginal land was forced into crop production under 
central planning.  The rate of decline in total cropland in East Germany was less than in West 
Germany and this will likely adjust.  Ecological concerns will heighten this pressure.  Again 
agricultural policy will affect the extent of adjustment, such as the level of set-aside payments, 
price supports, and payments for forestation. 
Within  the  crops  sector  there  will  be shifts  among  the  crops  as  well.  The former 
importance of potatoes and rye will be lost.  These areas will shift in favor of rapeseed, wheat, 
and barley.  Yield increases will magnify this shift.  Wheat and barley will also benefit from the 
shift out of sugar beet area.  Future yield  increases  for sugar beets in conjunction with  the 
production quota system will force area out of sugar beets unless the present quota allocation is 
altered to give a greater allowance for eastern Germany. 
It  is unlikely that these production adjustments will be balanced by demand changes.  Per 
capita food demand in East Germany was near to or for some commodities exceeded levels in 
West Germany.  Within the price structure there was a considerable distortion of relative prices. 
Basic foods were heavily subsidized and removal of those subsidies resulted in a rise in their 
prices.  Prices for other goods which  had  been  held  artificially high  and  rationed  fell  after 
economic union.  The expectation is that total consumer expenditure will shift away from food 
and that food consumption patterns will shift toward West German patterns.  That would raise 
the meat and dairy products components of food expenditures.  Fruits (tropical) and vegetables 
would also benefit.  Much lower consumption of grains and potatoes is expected.  Overall an 
increase in quality and variety is expected, but not quantity.  Reduced livestock numbers will 
cut feed use.  Improved feed quality will likely expand demand per animal for protein feeds, and 
30 the introduction of EC price distortions will encourage grain substitutes.  Feeding of potatoes, 
root crops, and probably grain, will decline. 
With the decline in food demand in eastern Germany and the contraction of the livestock 
sector,  expansion  of wheat  and  barley  production  will  add  to  surplus  pressure  within  the 
European Community.  This has already happened to some extent, but will likely become more 
intense.  A larger grain surplus will pressure intervention costs and export refund costs.  Trade 
tensions with grain exporting countries could be heightened. The increased protein share of the 
smaller livestock industry will likely be met mostly through the growth in rapeseed output rather 
than  through imports -- much  to the dismay of oilseed exporting countries.  Some gains for 
exporters of  grain substitutes can be anticipated.  Overall it is unlikely that eastern Germany will 
follow the path seen for China following its reforms in 1979 where increased production was 
followed by larger income gains in later years and after an initial drop imports rose. 
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